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Mobile users often post nearest neighbor queries based on their current location. Usually, the mobile terminal (user)
sends a request to query an untrusted location server, including the position information of the mobile terminal
requests, thus leading to the disclosure of one’s location. For mobile users providing location services, the privacy
of mobile users is crucial. This demand is particularly evident in the mobile network application. According to the
structural characteristics of the mobile network, the use of hidden ring and hidden tree can blur mobile subscriber
location information in the mobile network and effectively ensure location privacy. This paper proposes a new
method of protecting location privacy known as Hidden Ring and Hidden Forest (HRHF), which is the use of
breadth-first search to meet certain requirements of the ring and forest in the graph. Based on experimental testing
of real and simulated data sets, the HRHF method has demonstrated its effectiveness in protecting location privacy
and efficiency in providing quality services.
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In recent years, location-based services have been grad-
ually integrated into everyday life and have consequently
brought individuals greater convenience. For example,
location service can be provided to a mobile user inter-
ested in queries such as, “where is the nearest bus stop?”;
“how do I get to the station?”; and “is there traffic
ahead?”
In order to utilize location-based services, mobile
users must send their service provider accurate location
information to fulfill the query request. Usually, the lo-
cation service provider’s server is not credible, and the
location information of the user is vulnerable to theft.
After stealing the location information of a mobile user,
the thief, via location tracking or links to other public
information (such as geographic database, encoding the
phone book), may be able to confirm the user’s identity
and gain additional private information [1–3].
How can the location of mobile users be further pro-
tected? This problem has already aroused the attention
of experts and scholars, and as a result, many solutions
have been put forward. At present, most of the research* Correspondence: kungao@live.com
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space (free space), which is namely one’s moving direc-
tion without any constraints. The main protection
method used is the exact location of the user with a fur-
ther comprise at least k −1 instead of individual regions
of space, so that the attacker cannot obtain a person’s lo-
cation by way of inference attack to match its status.
Simultaneously, this method uses much space area size
and the number of included to measure the privacy pro-
tection provided by the user [4].
In reality, however, people either walk or ride a vehicle
and always follow a fixed mobile network. As an illustra-
tion, a simple mobile network model with mobile users
and their sites of interest is shown in Fig. 1. Obviously,
in the highway network environment, you cannot use
the size of the area of space to measure the strength of
privacy, because the road network for two spatial regions
of equal area, if one contains a link, and the other contains
three sections, so to protect the strength of the latter than
the former. In addition, the regional space contains only a
section of the user that the attacker can easily use for
tracking. As a result, space hidden no longer applies to the
mobile network environment [5, 6].
In addition, in order to alleviate traffic pressure, many
cities have implemented one-way traffic provisions, inis distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and




















Fig. 1 A model of simple mobile network
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direction. Diligent practice at home and abroad has
proven that one-way traffic plays an important role in
solving city traffic problems. Therefore, in the mobile
network structure of a single line (complex mobile net-
work), how can the protection of mobile user location
privacy be ensured? This is a new challenge.
Challenge. The mobile network has its own character-
istics; a tradeoff exists between location privacy protec-
tion based on efficiency and quality in location services.
Excavating potential structural features in the mobile
network to protect the mobile user’s location privacy
while providing high-quality services will be a significant
challenge.
Contribution. Through the observation of simple and
complex mobile network structures, two hidden sub-
graph structures have been defined: the cloaking ring
and hidden tree (mobile user distribution and location
privacy must meet certain requirements of the ring and
the tree). The two hidden subgraph-based structures
have brought forward a new method of location privacy
protection—Hidden Ring and Hidden Forest (HRHF).
This method not only can effectively protect a mobile
user’s location privacy but can also provide mobile users
with high-quality location-based services. In addition, by
considering that the mobile network consists of a single
line and utilizing the HRHF, the network environment
problems pertaining to complex mobile location privacy
protection were successfully solved.
Section 2. reviews related work location privacy pro-
tection technology; Section 3. introduces the formal def-
inition, and some background knowledge is provided to
solve the problem; Sections 4. and 5. respectively intro-
duce the simple model and construction of the mobile
network in HRHF structure; Section 6. introduces the
location privacy protection complex in the mobile net-
work, the location privacy protection method, and gives
the complete HRHF; the experimental results andanalysis system will be introduced in Section 7.; and
Section 8. summarizes the entire text.
2 Related work
In recent years, many methods have been brought forth
to ensure the privacy protection of mobile users. These
methods can be divided into two categories: spatial re-
gions of occult [7–9] and false position [10–12]. Gener-
ally, space technology is used in the hidden location
anonymity model k-. The model k-, first proposed in the
literature [13–15], refers to the anonymous position oc-
curring when the location information of at least one
other individual and the position information of k-1 can-
not be distinguished. As a result, the person’s position to
meet the position of k- becomes anonymous. Li et al.
[16] also proposed an Interval Cloak algorithm based on
binary tree 4. Given that the literature value of K is set
in the system and does not meet the personalized needs
of location privacy, Li and Jung [17] proposed that the
k- anonymous user model could be customized to allow
the user to specify the degree of anonymity, thereby pro-
posing the Clique Cloak algorithm. Due to the anonym-
ous success rate is low, Liu [18, 19] proposes an
improved algorithm based on the directed graph [20].
Using Complete Pyramid Data Structure and Incomplete
Pyramid Data Structure to maintain the location infor-
mation of mobile users, and based on these two data
structures, basic and adaptive algorithms were proposed.
Ma et al. [21] have proposed a dynamic bottom-up and
top-down grid hiding algorithm. Namiot and Sneps-
Sneppe [22] propose Nearest Neighbor Cloak algorithm
and Hilbert Cloak algorithm. The system architecture in
the above literature consists of a central server structure
[23, 24], which is used in distributed point-to-point
structure. In Pan et al. [25], mobile users, before sending
the query to the location server, send grouped requests
first through to other peer nodes to form a space area,
which will later be sent to the server along with the
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cases, Namiot [22] proposes a Hilbert space filling curve
high k-anonymous space to build mechanisms to en-
hance anonymous success rates of the system. Puttas-
wamy et al. and Rahimi et al. [26, 27] use a false location
technology. In Resch [28], mobile users generate a false
position and location of their true position and send it
to the server. Because the attacker cannot identify the
true position of the user, the user’s location privacy is ef-
fectively protected. In Puttaswamy et al. [26], mobile
users only send specified false position. The server re-
ceives incremental nearest neighbor queries based on
this false position, and query results are returned to the
users; according to the returned results, the users no
longer retrieve the answers they want.
The above assumes that all users are moving in a free
space. However, in reality, people often walk in the mo-
bile network. Shen and Zhao [29] first noticed this prob-
lem and brought forward the location privacy protection
model XStar. However, Shen and Zhao [29] only con-
sider the simple mobile network (all roads are double
line) of the location privacy protection environment.
This is considered to be simultaneously a both simple
and complex mobile network (including the single line)
on the basis of a new location privacy protection method
based on a hidden subgraph.
3 Background knowledge and definition
This section describes the work closely related to the mo-
bile network model, location anonymity system structure,
mobile user location privacy, and problem definition.
3.1 Simple mobile network model
An undirected graph UG = (vertex, edge) can be used to
represent simple mobile networks. For example, Fig. 1
shows a simple model of a mobile network. Each side of
the model can be regarded as a moving double line. A
vertex with 1 degree can be seen as the end of the net-
work; a vertex with 2 degrees can be seen as the bend of
the network; and a vertex with 3 degrees or more can be
seen as the intersection of the network. In addition, the
model also used small squares to represent mobile users,
with a small dot indicating the location in which the
mobile users are interested, such as shops, gas stations,
and hotels.Location anonymousMobile User
Query containing exact 
location information 
Query results
Fig. 2 Location anonymity architecture3.2 Anonymous location system structure
The central server architecture [30], which is found
between the mobile client and server-side position to
add a trusted server, is commonly referred to as the an-
onymous location device. As shown in Fig. 2, location
anonymity equipment will anonymity-process the user’s
accurate location information, and at the same time, it
accurate processes the candidate results returned by the
location server. The main work of this paper is to design
an effective algorithm for the location of the anonymous
device.
3.3 Mobile user location privacy
At present, two privacy protection models have been
proposed: one being k- anonymity and the other is the
road l- diversity. This paper combines these two models.
The diversity of the mobile network model is proposed
in [31–34]. In this system, if the user’s location informa-
tion to meet k- is anonymous, containing at least l dif-
ferent section, then the anonymous location satisfies
road l- diversity. If an anonymous location contains only
a link, then the attacker will easily track people traveling
the road. On the contrary, if three or more sections of
this anonymous location are present, then the tracking
difficulty will increase. Furthermore, section l- diversity
is an essential condition of user location privacy in the
mobile network.
While K and L measure the location privacy protection
strength parameters, this paper provides another param-
eter: Locationmax. Locationmax outlined the number of
sections containing an anonymous location in the upper
limit. Although many sections of the number of users
can provide strong privacy protection, this will result in
a higher price for location server query processing and a
decrease in service quality. In order to achieve balance
in privacy protection, query processing cost, and service
quality among the three, constraint parameters were
proposed.
3.3.1 Definition 1: location privacy
K, Location, and Locationmax represent the position of a
mobile user’s privacy, where K is the least amount of a
mobile user’s anonymous locations included and Loca-
tion (Locationmax) represents the number of sections of
an anonymous position included. Location privacy of server Location access server
Query containing anonymous 
location information 
Candidate query results 
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expressed as Privacy(user) = (K, Location, Locationmax).
The location privacy of a user by his own decision and
the location privacy with accurate location information
of the user’s query will be sent to the anonymous device
together.
3.4 Problem definition
Firstly, some assumptions about the attacker’s back-
ground knowledge are required: the attacker must know
in advance the location privacy protection algorithm and
can obtain the number of mobile networks on each sec-
tion. The problem provided in this paper is based on this
definition.
Suppose there is a request for location-based services
from a mobile user—the privacy of his or her position
(K, Location, Locationmax). Then the position of the
anonymous system should dictate how the mobile user
finds a hidden section set S and make the S precise pos-
ition cover not only u but also to meet Sk ' ≥ k, Location ≤
S. Location ' ≤ Locationmax. In addition, the attacker
cannot infer a specific location U from S with high
probability.
How do we extrapolate the user’s specific location
after stealing the hidden sections? Normally, the attacker
in turn assumes that u is located in this section for each
section Si (i = 1, 2,…, L ') of S. Then the attacker will
perform a location privacy protection algorithm on the
section and get a hidden section set S'. It compares S'
with S to reach the number of the same section of those
two sets and the ratio of all sections in the S. Finally,
the attacker deduces the probability of u belonging to
the section Si: ri/(r1 + r2 +…r3).
4 Simple hidden ring structure under mobile
networks
This section first analyzes the protection characteristic
of a simple mobile network and then introduces three
steps to find the optimal hidden ring for users.
4.1 Hidden ring
The structural characteristics of the simple observation
model in a mobile network are the result of the sym-
metry of the ring to the mobile user location privacy
protection in the mobile network. Because for the ring,
no matter which edge of the ring the attacker performs
the lookup algorithm, he will get the same result, further
deducing that the probability of each edge in the ring is
equal. So the attacker cannot identify the user’s edge (lo-
cation), then the user’s location privacy will be well
protected.
The background knowledge of the attacker assumes
that he or she knows the number of mobile users in each
section, so it is possible for an attacker to use thisinformation to exclude users where there can be no
road. So, by the above analysis, the definition of a hidden
ring is to protect the location privacy of mobile users.
4.1.1 Definition 2: hidden ring
A ring of an undirected graph, in which the number of
mobile users and the number of sections it contains
both meet the user’s location privacy, has at least two
sections of the mobile user.
In an undirected graph, covering a user’s location may
require more than one ring. For example, in Fig. 1, cov-
ering the user1 ring with the exception of <node13,
node14, node18, node17, node13>, ring <node14, node15,
node19, node18, node14> and ring <node14, node3, node4,
node5, node15, node19, node18, node14>, etc. So after
finding his cover ring for the user, it must be determined
whether these rings are the hidden rings. If more than
one ring is in line with the concealed conditions, then
one must select the number of sections and mobile sub-
scribers closest to the user location privacy ring (called
the ring for the optimal hidden ring) as users of the hid-
den position. This is because in all the hidden rings, the
number of mobile users and sections will cause location
server query processing cost to be higher. At the same
time, it also can reduce the quality of mobile client
service. So it is a necessary step to select the optimal
hidden ring.
In order to be able to quickly find the optimal hidden
ring, first, find the minimum coverage of the user’s loca-
tion and then determine whether these meet the hidden
conditions. If only one ring meets the conditions, then it
is the optimal hidden ring; if more than one ring simul-
taneously satisfies the conditions, then choose the opti-
mal hidden ring; if no rings meet the conditions, then
the number of mobile users and (or) section numbers is
less than the user location privacy. Firstly, extend the
ring and then determine whether the expansion ring
meets hidden conditions. Finally, select the optimal
hidden ring from the expansion ring.
4.2 Find the minimum ring
Using the method to map the width, first, search for
users to discover the ring. In order to make the ring
cover the location of the user, two edges must form
where the end user is used as the initial search point
and the target point of the minimum. First, based on the
user’s side, specify the starting point of the search and
the target point (as in the undirected graph, whether to
specify which endpoint is the starting point of the user
or to find the minimum ring end is the same, so the
starting point can be any two points. If the starting point
is selected, then another endpoint becomes the target
point). Then when the search reaches the vertex of the
target point, the minimum ring covering the user’s
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find the minimum edge of the structure from the access
over the edge. The small details are found in algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1. Find the minimum ring.
Input: undirected graph G; user id; access vertex
queue Q; access edge vector V
Output: constituting the respective sides of the
minimum ring
1. According to the Userid positioning the user’s edge;
2. To obtain the relevant information Userinfo on the
edge;
3. Specify the starting point Pointstart and stopping
point Pointstop for the search;
4. Set all the vertices and edges of the G is not
accessible;
5. Access vertex Pointstart, Pointstop and edge Edgestart-stop;
6. Pointstart into the queue Queue
7. While Queue is not empty
8. Head element out of Queue, and assigned it to the
variable Variable;
9. for each adjacent vertices Vertice of Variable;
10. if Vertice is not accessible
11. access Vertice and insert into Queue;
12. access edge Edgevariable-vertice, get the information
on the edge Edgevariable-vertice, and save (Variable,
Vertice, Userinfo to vector Vector;
13. Else
14. If Edgevariable-vertice is not accessible
15. access edge Edgevariable-vertice, get the information
on the edge Edgevariable-vertice, and save (Variable,
Vertice, Userinfo to vector Vector;
16. End if
17. End if
18. If Variable = Pointstop and Vertice <>Pointstart
19. insert (Pointstart, Pointstop, Userinfo) into Vector;
20. Using recursive method to find respective edges
constituting the smallest ring, and output;
21. End if
22. End for
23. End whilenode17 node19
node13 node16 node15
node8 node2 node7 node5
node18a
node1node14
Fig. 3 Using breadth-first search for discovering minimum ring of user1. a
mobile networkIn Fig. 3, we take user1 as an example to illustrate the
minimum ring discovery process. First, because user1’s
edge is node14node18; node18 should be specified as the
starting point with node14 as the stopping point (in
Fig. 3a, gray solid circles represent the starting point and
target point of the search). Then, all the vertices and
edges of undirected graph G not being accessed should
be set, with node14, node18 and node14node18 edges
and vertices accessed. Search starting from node18, the
first access adjacent to point node17, node19, and the ad-
jacent edge node18node17, node18node19, node18node17,
and node18node19 which is not accessed by node18. In
the meantime, preserve the edge information of node18-
node17and node18node19. Similarly, the adjacent nodes
and edges (which cannot be accessed by node17 and
node19) node13, node16, node15, node17 node13 and
node19node15 will be accessed in turn. When the adja-
cent node14 is accessed, the minimum ring will be dis-
covered. Finally, the two minimum rings for user1 were
found in these cases: “node18, node17, node13, node14,
node18” and “node18, node19, node15, node14, node18.”
The thick lines in Fig. 3a show from the starting point
to the target point node18 node14 accessed path. At the
same time, the dotted lines in Fig. 3b show two mini-
mum rings for user1 found in the simple model mobile
network.
4.3 Select the optimal hidden ring
After the statistics on the number of sections and each
minimum ring on the mobile user, for those who meet
the conditions of the minimum hidden ring, formula (1)
can be used to measure the proximity of each privileged
ring and user location privacy that is scoring for each
ring hidden. The higher the score, the closer to the
user’s location privacy.





In formula (1), αi and αk are two weight coefficients
and their values are between 0 and 1, and αi + αk = 1. δj







Discovering the minimum ring for user1. b Minimum ring in simple
node9
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δj and εp represent the number of mobile users and sec-
tions contained in the hidden ring, respectively. When
δj = δk, εp = εc, the rank reached the maximum value of
1. Theoretically, the number of sections has a greater
impact on the cost of query processing and, therefore,
pays more attention to the close degree of εp and εc.node10 node11
Fig. 4 Discovery minimum ring for users U24.4 Expansion of the minimum ring
Expansion of the minimum ring occurs when the num-
ber of users and sections is less than the user location
privacy and (or) the ring is provided with a mobile user
number less than 2. With similar methods, begin with
the smallest ring. First, save the vertices in which the
vertex degree is greater than 2 in the minimum ring,
then choose the starting point and target points of the
search from these vertices. Next, search the extension of
the minimum ring based on each pair of the starting
point and the target point.
For example, in the minimum ring of user1 <node18,
node17, node13, node14, node18>, if you choose (node14,
node13) as the starting point and the target point, re-
spectively, you can obtain the ring <node14, node3,
node2, node13, node17, node18, node14>; if you choose
(node13, node17), you can get the ring <node14, node16,
node17, node18, node14>. In order to ensure that the ex-
panded ring can still override the user’s location, it can-
not be selected (node14, node18) again as the starting
point and destination of the search.5 Constructing the hidden tree under simple
mobile networks
This section firstly defines a subgraph hidden tree as
complementary with a hidden tree, then describes how
to find the user hidden tree.5.1 Hidden tree
Although the hidden ring can protect the mobile user’s
location privacy, not all users can find the minimum ring
covering their position.
For example, Fig. 4 shows the minimum discovery
process for user2. Because user2 where the edge is node8-
node9, the starting point of the search is specified as
node9 with a target point at node8. Starting from the
node9 search algorithm, the search is expected to reach
vertex node8. Unfortunately, as node8 is not found, user2
is not covered in the position in the mobile network
ring.
We found no subgraph smallest ring (for example,
Fig. 4 subgraph) through observation; in fact, only free
trees were found. The following were defining free trees
which can protect the mobile user’s location privacy.5.1.1 Definition 3: edge of the tree
An edge which is not covered by an undirected graph.
5.1.2 Definition 4: boundary of the tree
Free tree constructed only by edges in an undirected
graph.
For example, a boundary tree is shown in Fig. 4.
Because the edge n9n10, n9n11 is a tree.
5.1.3 Definition 5: relative maximum boundary tree
A boundary tree of an undirected graph, if adds an edge,
is not a border tree.
For example, in Fig. 1, a boundary tree, which consists
of node9node10, node9node11, node9node8, and node8-
node12, is a relative maximum boundary tree.
For each relative maximum boundary edge of the tree,
the tree is only a relative maximum boundary. Regard-
less of from which side the attacker is performing a
search for the relative maximum boundary tree algo-
rithm, he or she will receive a relative maximum bound-
ary in the same tree, so that the attacker is unable to
know each section of the mobile network and the num-
ber of mobile users. So, in the case of the attacker is not
able to know the number of mobile users on each sec-
tion of the mobile network, he will get the conclusion:
the possibility of users in each edge is equal.
5.1.4 Definition 6: hidden tree
Relative maximum boundary trees, the number of sec-
tions and the number of mobile objects it contains that
meet the user’s location privacy, and the tree have at
least two sections of the presence of the mobile user.
According to the hidden tree definition, to seek to
cover one’s position-concealed tree for the user, one
should first find the cover of his position-relative max-
imum boundary tree, then the relative maximum bound-
ary tree to determine whether it meets the latent tree
condition. If satisfied, then we maximize the phase
boundary tree, as the user’s latent tree. However, if
unsatisfied, then a relative maximum boundary tree
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must meet the user location privacy of mobile users and
distribution in sections of the requirements.
5.2 Search the relative maximum boundary tree
The process of looking for the relative maximum bound-
ary tree actually occurs in the process of gradually
searching by the side of the tree. This is because the
user’s edge is a tree. To save the user’s edge information
and access the two vertices of the edge, they are succes-
sively inserted into the queue. For every vertex of the
queue, one must first determine whether the vertex be-
tween adjacent vertices and the edges of the access is a
tree. If it is a tree, then access the adjacent vertices and
the adjacent vertices into the queue (that will continue
down this path and then save the search) by the side of
the tree information; if not, perform any operation on
the right adjacent vertex (which is the path search so
far). Repeat the above steps until the queue becomes an
empty stop. Algorithm 2 gives details for the relative
maximum boundary tree for users.
Algorithm 2. Looking for the relative maximum
boundary tree.
Input: undirected graph UG; User; access vertices
Queue; save a tree edge Vector
Output: the relative maximum boundary edges of the
tree
1. According to the userid to get user’s edge
nodeinodej;
2. To obtain relevant information userinfo of edge
nodeinodej;
3. To save (Nodei, Nodej, userinfo) in Vector;
4. No to all vertices of UG are set to not be accessed;
5. Access vertex nodeinodej;
6. Insert nodeinodej into the Queue;
7. While Queue is not empty
8. Move head element out of the queue, and
assignment to user;
9. For each adjacent vertices
10. If vertices not being accessed





Fig. 5 Looking for the relative maximum boundary tree for U2. a Looking f12. Analyzing the edge whether is the edge of the tree;
13. If the edge is a tree edge
14. Inset it into the queue;
15. Obtain relevant information;





In Fig. 5, we take the search for the relative maximum
boundary tree for user2 as an example to illustrate the
process. Because user2’s edge is node9node8, the edge
node9node8 information has been saved. In addition, the
vertices of node9 and node8 have been accessed and they
inserted in the queue. Then the node9 has been moved
out of the queue, with the first search to start from
node9. As shown in Fig. 5a, node9 is not accessible. Its
adjacent vertices are node10, node11, and node9node10,
and node9node11 function as the tree. Furthermore, after
node10, node11 has been set to visit, they will be inserted
into the queue. The edge of node9node10, node9node11
will be saved and mapped with thick lines to indicate the
edge preservation. Then the node8 is out of the queue,
as the edges of node8node13 and node8node7 being not
the edge of the tree, so do not do any action for vertex
node7, node13. node8node12 is a tree, after access node12,
which will be inserted into the queue and saves the edge
information of node8node12. Given that the adjacent ver-
tex node10, node11 and node12 have been unvisited, they
must terminate after they are taken out of the queue al-
gorithm. Finally, one will find that the user2-relative
maximum boundary tree is composed of node9node10,
node9node11, node9node8, edge graph of node8node12.
The dotted lines in Fig. 5b show that user2 is the relative
maximum boundary tree found in the simple model of
the mobile network.
5.3 Constructing hidden forest
In order to reduce the cost of location server query pro-
cessing, the required number of mobile users and sec-





or RMBT for U2. b RMBT in the model of simple mobile network
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the user. So how can this be achieved? This paper’s pres-
ervation section numbers were 1, 3, and 5, with low
query processing costs, relative maximum boundary tree
information, and each section of the number of relative
maximum boundary tree, according to the information
contained in the number of trees from the smallest to
the largest number of mobile users in sequential order.
If a small number of mobile users had constructed the
hidden forest, then calculate the differencek value of the
number of mobile users and from the road number 1
relative maximum boundary tree information in a select
number of mobile users closest to differencek the relative
maximum boundary tree. If it is due to a small number
of road to go construction of hidden forest, then calcu-
late the difference of differencel out of the number of
segments. Next, according to the differencel, calculate
the required number of sections of the number of rela-
tive maximum boundary tree according to the number
of sequence selected for each relative maximum bound-
ary tree. If due to the small number of sections and
mobile users to construct hidden forest, then in addition
to calculating the required number of sections of the
relative maximum boundary tree based on difference,
select the number of mobile users which is closest to
differencek.
6 Location privacy protection under the complex
mobile networks
These two sections mainly introduce how to protect mo-
bile user’s location privacy through the method of undir-
ected graph structure and tree ring hidden in the simple
mobile network model. Then this section will introduce
the problem surrounding location privacy in the com-












Fig. 6 A complex model of mobile networkprivacy protection algorithm is provided at the end of
this section.
The real life mobile network is a very common
method. In easing city traffic congestion, reducing the
intersection point of conflict and improving the running
speed of the vehicle play a very big role. At present,
many one-way traffic systems exist in cities such as New
York, London, and Singapore.
For mobile networks consisting of a single line, a di-
rected graph can be abstracted. For example, Fig. 6
shows a complex model of the mobile network. In this
model, there are four single lines: node17node13, node13-
node2, node3node14, and node14node18. In the complex
mobile network model, the study found that the sub-
graph structure hidden ring and concealed tree can still
provide users with location privacy protection.
6.1 Constructing the directed hidden ring
In the directed graph, vertices are connected by the arc,
so that the phase diagram of the ring maintains direction
(clockwise or counterclockwise), without hindering any
protection. For a ring, the attacker, whether using the
executive loop algorithm which arc to find the ring, will
obtain the same results. This ring is a ring, so if a ring
can meet the user’s location privacy, and it has at least
two arcs that have mobile users, then the ring can pro-
tect the user’s location privacy. Such a ring is called to
conceal the ring. Wherein selecting the best method to
hide the ring with the best non-selective methods of oc-
cult ring to figure the same, and the other two steps and
the undirected slightly different figure, this describes the
smallest, found to have a ring and extends the minimum
directed ring. For example, Fig. 7a, b shows that in the
case of different starting points for the user to find the


























Fig. 8 Looking for a relative maximum boundary tree for a user
under complex mobile network
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node3, node14, node13>.
For the extension of the minimum ring in a directed
graph, the degree of a vertex has a different direction.
The selection of the starting point and the target point
of the expansion ring is different with that of the undir-
ected graph. The minimum to the vertex ring and the
degrees were reduced by 1. Next, save and penetrate
more than 0 of the remaining vertices, then select the
starting point of the search and target point from the
two kinds of vertices.
For example, in Fig. 6, assuming the coverage of user1,
minimum directed ring is <node18, node17, node13,
node14, node18>, after each vertex ring, and the degrees
were reduced by 1, from node17, node13, node18, vertex
node14, and the degrees are greater than 0. If you choose
<node13 node14> as the starting point of the search and
target points, it will be extended to the ring <node18,
node17, node13, node2, node3, node14, node18>; <node17
node13 > if, then, will be extended to the ring <node18,
node17, node16, node7, node8 node13, node14, node18>.
6.2 Hidden tree in the directed graph
In the directed graph, we cannot find the smallest ring
for the user, but the users are generally located within
the double line. Because a single line in the mobile net-
work layout meets the specific complementary theory—-
namely in a single line to design an opposite direction of
the single line—they should be as close as possible.
Given the single complementary theoretical guarantee of
users starting from a single line, he was able to return to
the other through the line and single line. Therefore, if
the user is located within a single line, he will certainly
be able to find his position to cover the ring. As the user
is only in the double line when he could not find the
minimum ring, then this kind of double line can func-
tion as a tree. To protect location privacy in the user
tree on the edge, we can construct hidden tree or hidden
forest for users.
For example, in Fig. 6, user2, due to the discovery in
“node8, node9” as the starting point and the target point
not having been found in the ring, and “node9 node8” as
the starting point and the target point has also failed tofind a minimum, to determine the node8node9 tree is
difficult. How can user2 find the relative maximum
boundary tree? As shown in Fig. 8, first, visit the vertices
of node9, node8 and insert them in the queue. Then
search starting from the vertex node9. Adjacent vertex
node10 first reveals that node9 is not accessible, because
node9node10 does not have any arc ring cover. Next,
judge whether node10node9 would not be any arc ring
cover. If it is, then node9node10 is a tree, and you can ac-
cess the vertex node10. Insert it into the queue and save
the information of node9node10 tree. In the same way,
judging from node9node11, node8node12 will also be a
tree, so for the user user2 to find the relative maximum
boundary tree is the tree by node9node10, node9node11,
node9node8, node8node12 graph.
If the number of mobile users, for users to find the
relative maximum boundary tree, contains a section
number less than the user location privacy and (or) does
not meet the distribution of mobile users in the sections
of the requirements, it is the same for the user to con-
struct hidden forest. The construction method of undir-
ected graph hidden forest is basically the same.
6.3 Protection method for hidden ring and forest
When a request message receives the anonymous loca-
tion of a user, for the user to construct the first attempt
to conceal ring, if the ring has been found, and then
choose the optimal execution hidden ring, the minimum
ring expansion algorithm is necessary. If the ring is not
Table 1 The parameters in the request message and the
default values





Gao et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:205 Page 10 of 15found, then the position of the anonymous system for
the user structure will be hidden or hidden in forest
trees. Algorithm 3 describes the details.
Algorithm 3. Hidden Ring and Hidden Forest - HRHF.
Input: undirected graph UG; userid;
Output: Hidden section set
1. Find the minimum ring for userid (algorithm 1);
2. If find the ring
3. Choose the best hiding ring;
4. if choose the optimal hidden ring
5. Returns this optimal ring as the user hidden
position;
6. Else
7. If there can be expansion ring
8. Extended minimum;




13. Looking for the relative maximum boundary tree
for userid (algorithm 2);
14. To determine whether or not the relative
maximum boundary tree is hidden tree;
15. If is a hidden tree
16. Return this hidden tree as the user hidden position;
17. Else
18. Construct hidden forest for users;
19. Endif
20. Endif
7 The experimental results and analysis
This algorithm is implemented using the C++ program-
ming language, and the programming environment is
Microsoft Visual C++. The hardware environment is
3.0 GHz Intel dual core CPU, 8 GB memory. The oper-
ating system is Microsoft Windows 10.
7.1 Experimental data sets and parameter setting
The experimental data is set by the mobile network data
of California San Joaquin County in the USA. The mo-
bile network data includes 17,585 vertices and 239,906
edges. In order to demonstrate that the mobile network
contains a single line, the experiment set up 5458 special
edges, and the single line with a single complementary
theory. The use of Singhal and Shukla’s [35] mobile net-
work object generator is based on 10,000 generation mo-
bile objects. In addition, 13,738 points of interest are
generated in the mobile network, including shops and
gas stations. At the same time, the experiment set up
990 mobile users of the nearest neighbor query request
message.
The user’s query request message includes four param-
eters: Location, K, Locationmax, and Kmmp. The K,Location, and Locationmax are used on behalf of the
user’s location privacy, while Kmmp functions on behalf
of the user to query the nearest neighbor points of inter-
est. All query requests assume these four parameters are
subject to normal distribution. Table 1 provides the aver-
age value and variance of the four default parameters. In
the experiment, one parameter takes different averages,
while the other three parameters were collected and
their default values remain unchanged.
7.2 Algorithm evaluation
Experiments pertained to testing average information
entropy, anonymous success rates, the average execution
time of anonymity, and the relative anonymity of the
average execution time of the query results, and the
average size of candidate results in six aspects of the
proposed algorithm was measured.
(1)The average information entropy. The attacker
will come through the calculation of the user
probability of probabilityj in each section of the
concealed position (j = 1, 2,…, L'), providing users
with strong protection, so the information
entropy can measure the probability distribution
of Wang et al.[36], the calculation formula is as
shown in formula (2):




If the information entropy is greater, the attacker’s
need guesses that the average user’s exact location is
greater, further increasing the user protection
strength.
(2)The anonymous success rate refers to the
percentage of successful message number sent by
the algorithm and message number sent by all
mobile users [37–39]. This can reflect the location
privacy protection algorithm query response ability
request of the user; the higher the value, the better
algorithm.
For unsuccessful anonymous messages, this paper
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Fig. 9 Average information entropy
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position, then the user’s real position and the false
position are sent to the location server. The attacker
cannot identify which position is the true position of
the user, so the user’s location information will be
protected.
(3)The average time of anonymous execution refers to
the position of average anonymous system of user’s
exact location for anonymous time.
This is used to measure a location privacy
protection algorithm efficiency; the smaller the
value, the higher the efficiency of the algorithm.
(4)The relative degree of anonymity, refers to the
mobile object contains an anonymous position in
the number of j (the number of sections’ n’) and the
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Fig. 10 Anonymous success rateprivacy (section number n). It can be expressed as a
formula (3).
RDAj ¼ j ‘=j; RDAl ¼ n’ =n ð3Þ
When n ' and Locationmax are unchanged, RDAj
improves with any increases. This is because the
number of fixed sections on moving objects with
greater strength will protect users more effectively.
When j', Locationmax are constant, the closer RDAn
to 1, the result is better, because too many sections
will lead to higher cost of query processing and the
service quality will decline.
(5)The average query execution time uses the average
location server to query an anonymous location
time. It is used to measure the position of the server
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Fig. 11 The average anonymous execution time
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of algorithm will be improved. The location server
simulation experiment, the hidden subgraph for a
Kmm query, tests the performance of the proposed
algorithm.
(6)The average size of the candidate refers to the
location server for an anonymous location query.
The average candidate results returned to the
location server size. It is used to measure the cost of
communication between the server and the position
of the anonymous system. The average number of
candidate results is fewer if communication cost is
lower, and the performance of the algorithm is
improved.
7.3 Experiment results and analysis
(1)The average information entropy. Figure 9a, b shows
that when the parameters K and l are taking
different average values, this paper provides the
strength of privacy protection algorithm for mobile
users.FigFrom Fig. 9 we can see that regardless of the
complexity of the mobile network, the average
information entropy is greater than 0. 5. When the
average information entropy of a complex mobile
network is higher than a simple mobile network, the
algorithm for privacy protection strength provided


















simple network complex network
. 12 RDAk, RDAl with respect to different parameter K settingscomplex mobile networks. In addition, from Fig. 9a,
b the contrast can also be seen that the more hidden
position of section number is, the more protection
strength of customers receives.
(2)Anonymous success rate. Figure 10 shows the
change of anonymous success rate in each
parameter under different settings. From this figure,
we can see that four simple anonymous successes in
the mobile network rate are higher than in the
complex mobile network. This is because after
adding a single line, some roads are restrained in the
direction of traffic, resulting in the reduction of the
number of mobile networks. The original ring can
be extended. However, after adding a single line it
cannot be extended, resulting in more anonymous
failure situations.
In Fig. 10a, b, with the increase of K and Location,
the simple mobile network anonymous success rate
dropped slightly, and the complex mobile network
anonymous success rate decreased significantly.
When the average Location value was equal to 15,
the anonymous success rate was less than 70 %. This
shows that the algorithm in the complex network of
mobile location privacy is too high (K and Location
average value is greater than or equal to 13) and the
protective effect is unsatisfactory. In Fig. 10c, with
the increase of Locationmax, the anonymous success
rate also increased. When the average Locationmax
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Fig. 13 RDAk and RDAl with respect to different parameter K settings
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find the hidden location. The road number is greater
than 5 in many cases, resulting in the hidden
location for Location’ > Locationmax causing frequent
anonymous failures. The default Locationmax value is
set too small. From Fig. 10d can be seen when the
parameters were obtained from the default privacy,
anonymous success simple in the mobile network
rate close to 96 %, and the anonymous complex in
the mobile network success rate close to 86 %.
(3)The average execution time of anonymous. To find
the relative maximum boundary tree algorithm,
because in each search to judge one side is the side
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Fig. 14 The average query execution timehidden ring high time complexity. In order to
reduce the cost of the server query processing, this
paper takes too much time in choosing optimal
hidden ring and hidden in the process of forest.
You can see from Fig. 11 that with the increase of
the value of the parameters, the execution time
spent in anonymous location anonymity has
increased, especially in the simple mobile network.
This is mainly because when the K and L average
values are greater than or equal to 9, the success of
simple anonymity in the mobile network is much
higher than the rate of success of complex
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Fig. 15 The average candidate results 1
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show the variation of K and Location relative
anonymity degrees, respectively, in the case of
different settings.
In Fig. 12, with the increase of K, RDAk and RDAl
experience rapidly declines and slightly increases,
respectively. This shows that the mobile user’s
number does not increase the number of too many
sections, and thus will not lead to higher cost of
query processing. As can be seen from Fig. 13, with
a significant increase of L, RDAk gradually increased
while RDAl declined sharply. This contains the
number of hidden location sections, the increasing
number of mobile users, and the greater user
protection strength.
(5)The average query execution time. Because the kMM
query is the most common location service, the kMM
query processes on the hidden subgraph. As can be
seen from Fig. 14, only when l and Kmmp increases,
the average query execution time is gradually
increasing, indicating hidden position of road
section number, the query cost more time, and with
the increase in the number of users query nearest
neighbor points of interest, query the time needed
to be increased.
(6)The average size of the candidate. Figures 15 and 16














































Fig. 16 The average candidate results 2returns an increase in the number of candidate
results. In Fig. 15a, the candidate complex mobile
network number with the increase of K did not
change, but in Fig. 15b, the number of candidates
with the increase of location also increased
gradually. In the complex mobile network, the cost
of road communication can impact how much the
communication can influence the number of large
moving objects.8 Conclusions
Previous studies on location privacy pay little attention
to the location of the mobile network environment. We
have found two forms of a hidden subgraph used to
protect the privacy of a user’s location—hidden ring and
hidden tree—through observing simple and complex mo-
bile network structural features. We have proposed a new
method for ensuring privacy protection of location—-
Hidden Ring and Hidden Forest (HRHF)—based on these
two hidden subgraph structures. Not only that HRHF is
effective for simple mobile networks but it can also solve
the mobile network when it contains a single line in the
position of privacy concerns. In the test results of the ex-
periment based on real and simulated data sets, the HRHF
method shows its effectiveness in terms of location privacy
and efficiency in the provision of quality services.2 4 6 8 10
kmmp average value
simple network complex network
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